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THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CONSITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT Jacob Ziemann
Like many regional or global schem es of governance, the European Union has been criticized as lacking legitimacy because it appears less deliberative, democratic, and participatory than natio nal governments (Nagel, 2005 , Rabkin, 2005 . This broad criticism applied to the EU is often characterized as a "democratic defi cit". The possible existence of a democratic deficit in the EU has been a g rowing concern of politicians, academics, and citizens since the process of European integration began . For example, remedying the democratic defi cit is regularly cited as one of th e main reasons for creating and ratifying the Constitutional Treaty. It is no t surprising then that before and after the recent defeats of the European constitutional proj ect, with referendum 'no' votes in France and Holland, debate on the democratic deficit has b een lively. T his paper attempts to make sense of the debate abo ut the existence of the democratic defi cit in the EU an d to detail som e of the policy proposals for constitutional reform that are a product of the debate. I will show tha t the democratic deficit debate has generated compelling proposals about the direction that future constitutional developments in the EU should take.
Since tllis paper amounts to a survey of the current state of the democratic defi cit debate every effort will be made to select the most compelling recent arguments in the debate. Drawing on the literature generated in this debate, the first section of this paper articulates a central case for the existence of a democratic deficit in the EU. I will refer to this argument as the democratic deficit thesis . The next section examines the arguments of the opponents of the democratic defi cit thesis. The third section attempts to identify the remaining real points of contention between the two sides of trus debate. T he final section of the paper surveys some of the sets of policy proposals fo r refornling the Europea n Union that are a product of the ongoing democratic deficit debate.
THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT THESIS
A single definitio n for the democratic defi cit doesn't exist. The definiti o n va ries
The Democratic Deficit and the European Union's Constitutional Settlement immensely depending on the nationalities and intellectual positions of the conilllentators writing on European constitutio nal reform . The first systematic attempt to develop a 'standard case' of the democratic deficit came from Joseph Weiler and his coauthors (Weiler et. aI., 1995) . Tlus 'standard case' was m eant to be a set consisting of broadly used arguments by politicians, academics, and citizens. However, in recent debate this 'standard case' has been upgraded with the case o utlined below consisting of five arguments for the existence of the democratic deficit, based on an analysis first compiled by Andreas Follesdal and SirHon Hix (2006,534) .
First, the creati o n of the EU by the M aastricht Treaty and earlier agreements adva ncing European integration have resulted in a general increase in executive power and a general decrease in national govermllents' control over the lawmaking process (Andersen & Burns, 1996) . We will call this argument the 'strong national executives' argument. T he E uropean Union's institutional design is such that policy-making at the EU level is donunated by executive actors . Executive actors take the form of nati onal nunisters in the E uropean Council and national government appointees in the Commission. This contrasts with the structure of European national governments, where the government is usuall y accountable to voters thro ugh the actions of a parliament. The parliament holds the executive accountable by criticizing the behavior of the rninisters that make up the government and can , in extreme situations, remove the government from power. Having policy-making in EU do nunated by executive actors is not in itself a fault but it is problematic when the acti o ns of the executive actors cannot be controlled by national parliaments. Executive acto rs at the E U level are simply more isolated from n ati o nal parliamentary scrutiny and control 'than government nunisters at the national level. Because of the way policy making in the EU is structured it is easier for executive actors to ign ore the wishes of their nati onal parliaments which has led to an increase in executive power at the expense of national parliam ents.
This first problem, in theory, should be partially rem edied by the existence of the E uropea n Parliament. Yet, the second argument advances that the European Parliam ent is too weak to rein in executive actors in the EU. We will refer to tlus argument as the 'weak European Parliament' argument. After Maastricht it became clear that national parliaments were losing power relative to executive institutio ns. In response som e scholars like Lodge argued that the power of the European Parliament must increase relative to the Council and the Comnussion (1994). While it is true that the European Parliament has b ecom e progressively more powelful through successive refo rms it is still possible to c1ailll that it is weak compared to the executive acto rs in the Council. For example, the governments in the Council still get to set the legislative agenda by appointing the Comnussion.Also, w hile the European Parliament can veto the national governments' cho ice for Commission president and commissioners we can't really argue that the European Parliament elects these officials. When it comes to spending, the European Parliament can only anlend lines that the governments in the Council have labeled 'non-compulsory' spending. Finally, even the procedure of co-decision, which officially provides equ al power of legislation between the Council and the Parliam ent, does not actually allow the Parliament that much real power in legislating. This is the case because the majo rity of legislatio n is still passed under the consultation procedure w hich does not allow the Parliament full veto power (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, 535) . Despite years of reforms to strengthen the E uropean Parliament, arguably the most participatory institution in the EU and the o nl y directly elected body, it is still http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/13 simply too weak relative to the Commission and Council.
T he third argument in the democratic deficit thesis we will call the 'accountability' argument since it deals w ith the lack of democratic acco untability found in the E uropean Unio n . Setting aside the elections for th e E uropean Parliament, there are no direct E uropean electi o ns. C itizens in the EU in ste~ld elect their national governments w ho then sit in the Council and nominate commissioners. Yet, even the electi on of the European Parliament does no t produce democratic acco untability because these elections are not about the direction of the EU policy agenda or the politicians and parties opera ting at the E uropean level (Hix, 1999, 103) . E uropean Parliam ent electio ns are m ostly abo ut domestic issues not about EU policy's directio n . Nati o nal elections are also o nl y fou ght o n domestic issues not European issues. Since there is not a European elem ent in national and E uropean Parliament elections citizens are unable to effectively influ ence the policy agenda of the EU by expressing their preferences . The nature of current electio ns in the Euro pean Parliament and the second-order accountability of the Conunission and Council both lead to a situation w here the officials operating in E U institutions are o nly marginally accountable to citizens.
T he fourth argument we will call the 'distance' argument and it revolves around E U institutio ns being too distant or removed from voting citize ns.We have already discllssed that electoral control over the Council and the ConU11ission is too far rem oved but there is a more basic sense in which the EU is distant from its citizens. The institutio ns of the EU are very difl:e rent from nati o nal democratic institutio ns, and therefore, citizens have difficul ty understancling the EU . Since they have difficulty understanding the E U they are unable to examine the EU and decide whether it is dem ocra ti c or not. There are a number of examples of how E U institutions are radically different from dom estic institutions, and therefore, more difficult to understand. Take the Council , which conducts legislative business in secret but executive business in the public sphere. The Commissio n is not elected but appointed through a complex procedure. The policy creation process in the Council , the Commission, and the Parliament is also fundamentally technocratic rather than political (Wallace & Smith, 1995, 138) . From the perspective of an EU citizen, the European Unio n's institutio ns are highl y foreign and complex which creates a situation w here participati o n , deliberatio n , and expression of preferences by a citizen are challenging.
The final argument, which we will call the 'drift' argument, posits that the EU adopts policies which d rift away from citizens' real policy preferences. It also argues that the EU ends up adopting policies that are no t supported by a majority of voters or even a maj ority of m ember states. This happens because of the four arguments listed above but it also occurs because govenU11ents are able to pass policies at the European level that they could not find domestic support fo r. This critique is m ost notably developed by social democratic theorists, like Scharpf, who argue that the policy o utcomes of the EU decisio n making process are usually right of domestic policy status quos (1999) . H e supports tlus argument by claiming that at the domestic level governments are constrained by courts, parliam ents, and interest groups but at the European level many of these constraints are absent, poorly organized, or less powerful (1999). T he final part of the 'drift argument' argues that EU policy tends to be m ore skewed towards the interests of the owners of capital since businesses find it easier to coordinate their lobbying efforts at the European level since their interests are m o re concentrated. This compares to trade unions and consumer groups which have more diffuse interests that are m o re difficult to org;lIuze at the European level for effective lobbying. It is worth no ting that the 'drift argument' is the only compo nent of the democratic deficit thesis
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RESPONSE TO THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT THESIS
There are a wide variety of responses to the democratic deficit thesis arguments presented above. Giandomenico Majo ne was the first scholar to systematically attack certain argmnents of the democratic deficit thesis and claim that the EU was not in a state of democratic deficit but is only perceived by its citizens as democraticall y illegitimate because it lacks credibility (1999). R ecently, Andrew Moravcsik has attacked the democratic deficit thesis from a different starting point than M aj one. I believe Maj one's and M o ravcsik's responses taken together constitute the most persuasive argument against the democratic deficit thesis.
Majone views the EU as primarily a 'regulatory state ' (1996) . A 'regulatory state' attempts to address m arket failure and does so by creating policies which produ ce outcomes that are Pareto efficient. Tlus contrasts with natio nal governments in the m embers states w hich also deal with policies that are distributive or redistributive in outcome. M,uone believes that the m ember states have intentionally delegated their regulatory power to the Europea n level by creating the EU (1993). Some examples of this delegation can be seen in the creation of the common market, the making of monetary policy by the ECB, and the standardiza tion of health and safet y rules. Majone believes that these regulatory policies we re intentio nally isolated from domestic majoritarian government b ecause the best policy o utcom es are achieved o n these issues when policy making is isolated tro m popular pressure (1994). Through his perception of the EU as a 'regulatory state' M ajone weakens the 'strong national executive' argument of the dem ocratic deficit thesis.
With this view of the EU · in mind Maj o ne can also dismiss the 'distance' and 'accountability' arguments of the democrati c deficit thesis. If EU p olicy making was made m ore accountable to citizens or decreased its complexity then policy o utcomes would cease to be Pareto efficient. This is the case because allowing m o re participation and accountability would allow the political m ajority to select policy outcomes that may run counter to the political minority or the long term interests of the majority (Majone, 1994) . So in M ajone's view the 'distance' and 'accountability' arguments are actually assets for the EU since the EU is able to generate outcomes which national majoritarian parliaments canno t achieve subj ect to greater participation and accountability from citizens.
Taking this line of reasoning one step further Majone dispatches the 'weak European Parliament' argument by claiming that an EU dominated by the European Parliament or a directl y elected ConUlussion would end up politicizing regulato ry policy-making (1998). Politicization would lead to policy o utcomes which were redistributive and not just Pareto effi cient (1998). If policy-making at the EU became politicized the EU would become even more illegitimate since its main reaso n for existing, to isolate regulatory decisions from public pressure to achieve Pareto effi cient policy o utcomes, would cease to exist. So the weakness of the European Parliament decried by the 'weak European Parliament' argument also turns o ut to be an asset for the EU if we believe that the EU is predominately a 'regulatory state'. While Majone's reasoning does appear to defeat the democratic deficit thesis it is dependent on the normative and empirical claim that the EU is predonunately a 'regulatory state' . If we believe that the EU does and should playa role in crea ting policies that lead to http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/13 redistributive policy o utcomes then M aj o ne's argument weakens considerably. Yet, it is also worth noting that Maj o ne, even in the absence of a democratic defi cit, supports refo rrns to make the EU more credible with the public like increases in policy m aking transparency and improving the quality ofEU legislatio n (2005). H owever, it is still difl:lcult to igno re the fact that M ajone's attack on the dem ocratic defici t thesis relies o n a rather constrained perception of the E uropean Union's purpose and legitimate policy portfolio. W e will next examine Moravcsik 's argument against the democratic deficit thesis which does not n ecessaril y need the ' regulato ry state' fo undation.
Mo ra vcsik 's critiqu e of the dem ocratic defi cit thesis is the m ost extensive critique existing ill the literature and touches o n all five of the democratic deficit arguments. In a series of papers M oravcsik (2002b, 2004, 2005b, 2006a , & 2006b ) seem s to provide satisfactory answers to m ost of the dem ocratic deficit arguments.
In response to the 'distance' argument, Moravcsik argues that the E U policy m aking process is far more transparent than the policy making process in the domestic governments of m ember states (2004, (17) (18) . According the M o ravcsik, the EU has gone out of its way to m ake it easier for citizens to access documents or informatio n rela ted to EU policy making so they are not so confused as to be unable to fo nn preferences on EU policy (2004, 18) . H e argues it is now mu ch easier to get informatio n o n the policy making process at the EU level compared to the dom estic leveL H e also claims a number of safeguards exist to scrutinize the poli cy making process, even if it is technocratic, like the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament, national parliaments, and natio nal courts (2004, (19) (20) . Moravcsik thinks the sum of the aforementioned reasons makes a strong case for the EU to be viewed as an institution which is transparent and close to the citizens.
When Moravcsik turns his attention to the 'drift' argument, raised by so cial democrat sch olars, he finds no evidence that the EU lacks dem ocratic legitimacy because " its policies are biased against particular interests that are consensually recognized as legitimate" (2004 , 21) . M oravcsik claims that there is little to no evidence that regulato ry protection or social policies in Europe are b eing eroded as a result of an alleged neo-liberal bias in the E uropean Unio n's policy nu king (2004, 22) . Furthermore, M oravcsik points to the empirical claim that the level of social welfare provisio n in Europe has remained relatively stable throughout the process of European integratio n (2004, 22) . H e also sees the 'drift' argument as null since the £actors that drive increases in social spending are dom estically specific and not occurring at the EU level in a uniform manner (2004, 23) . H e finally concludes that the European Union's policies adequately reflect " patterns of consensus and contestation" within the bodies of citizens in the EU member states (2004, 24) .
Aside from examining the outcomes of EU policy to attack the 'drift' argument Moravcsik also points to the institutio nalized process constraints in the EU that prevent drift. The elaborate ch ecks and balances built into the structure of the EU ensure that an overwhelming consensus is required for any policy to be passed (2005b, 4 & 2002b, 6) . Take for example, the requirement of unanimity for reform of treatises followed by either majority in the Conunission plus a qualified majority in the European Parliam ent or unanimity in the CounciL Add on top of those checks judicial review by the European Court of Justice and national courts and it begins to look very difl:lcult for passed legislation to drift away from the majority viewpoints. So Moravcsik doesn't believe that any single group of private interests can dominate the policy m aking process (2004, 19) . This is also the case because minority viewpoints are consciously solicited by the Commission w hich actively seeks to listen to groups with diffuse interests. Groups with difiuse interests also have access to policy makers in the Council and the European Parliament.
The 'strong national executives' argument is also dispatched by Moravcsik through an argument that national executives are still the most directly accountable politicians in the member states (2002b, 8) . He argues that the "democratically elected governments of the Member States, which dominate the still largely territorial and intergovernmental structure of EU" are an important channel for creating democratic accountability at the EU level (2002b, 8) . Basically, he is arguing that the EU does strengthen the national executives that play dominant roles in EU institutions, but the 'executive argument' of the democratic deficit thesis is not problematic because these national executives are still democratically controlled by their domestic voters and parliaments.
In response to the 'weak European Parliament', Moravcsik agrees that this was a problem in the past but claims it no longer is. The EU, according to Moravcsik, has already properly addressed potential imbalances of power among its institutions by significantly increasing the powers of the European Parliament (2005b, 5). For example, the EP now oflicially has veto-power over the selection of the Commission and is exercising tlus power more frequently. Reforming the co-decision procedure in the Amsterdam Treaty now means that legislation cannot be passed under co-decision unless a majority is found in the Council and the Parliament. However, Moravcsik doesn't appear to fully defeat the 'parliament argument' since the consultation procedure can still be used to pass legislation, efIectively bypassing the co-decision procedure which would involve the Parliament.
In response to the lack of EU elections, what we referred to earlier as the 'accountability' argument, Moravcsik advances his strongest case against the democratic deficit thesis. Moravcsik rejects the prenuse that more opportl1luties for direct participation in public deliberation · will autoinatically lead to increased popular support for EU institutions (2005b, 5 & 2006, 222) . He doesn't believe that more opportl1luties to participate will cause citizens to participate more (2006, 223) . He also doesn't think such participation will bring ahout more informed deliberation about the direction of the EU policy agenda hy the voters (2006, 228) . Finally, he doesn't think that more informed deliberation on the part of citizens necessarily improves the political legitimacy of the EU or the trust that citizens have in the EU as an institution (2006, 233) .To prove this final point Moravcsik looks at polling data about institutional trust to argue that publics in advanced democracies generally like and trust insulated institutions like arnues, police forces, constitutional courts, and independent central banks more than legislatures (2006, 32 & 2004,24-25) . Once again it is shown that the 'accountability' argul11.ent may actually be an asset since its operation in the EU insulates policy portfolios that citizens feel are best insulated from popular pressure.
Moravcsik also mounts a second strand of attack on the 'accountability' argument by clainung that EU legislative policy portfolios are concentrated in issues of low salience to European voters (2004,25) . Therefore, any efiorts to expand the forums for participation, like more EU offices selected by elections, is unlikely to overcome apathy (2004, 25) . Moravcsik lists the five most salient issues, according to polls, in most EU members as health care provision, education, law and order, pension and social security policy, and taxation (2005b, 5). According to Moravcsik, none of these issues is a competency for the EU (2005b, 6). He concludes that it is possible that voters just choose to remain rationally ignorant about the EU agenda because the issues it touches are not important to them (2006a, 230). For http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/13 this same reason Moravcsik argues that European Parliament elections do not work and will not be contests about the EU agenda anytime soon (2002b, 11). European Parliament elections become about domestic politics because only domestic issues are salient enough to mobilize popular support during an election. So ultimately, more political contestation through elections will not make the EU more democratic, according to Moravcsik, because "lack of salience, not lack of opportunity, may be the critical constraint on European political pal-ticipation (2004,24)".
POINTS OF CONTENTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DEBATE
By the process oflaying out the fullest respo nse to the democratic deficit thesis in the previo us section we have already covered most of the main points of contention. However, three major points of contention still seem to separate the two sides of this debate. First, we must question Majon e's main contention that the EU is a 'regulatory state' (1999). Majone 's theoretical assumption that purely Pareto efi"icient policies with no redistributive effects may on normative grounds be isolated ti-om democratic accountability is correct. However, as Hix and Follesdal point out, the problem comes at the empirical level since the "empirical reality of decisions is a continuum between policies that are predominately efficient and policies that are predominately redistributive, with many mixes (2006,542)". On one side of the continuum we have judicial decision and technical decisions about products which are at the efficient extrem e. On the redistributive extreme we have EU expenditure policies. In between these two extremes the bulk of EU policy making occurs, like the construction and regulation of the market, competition policies, and interest rate policies. Furthermore, Hix and Follesdal emphasize, that at the individual level the winners and losers from redistributive polices are nl.Uch more apparent (2006, 543) . For example, farmers, depressed regions, and researchers are net winners because they receive large amounts of the EU budget as a percentage of their income. Taxpayers at the individual level who pay into the EU budget receive widely varying amounts of net-benefit or net-loss from EU expenditures policies. Majone may wish that all EU regulation was only purely Pareto efficient.Yet, m any EU regulatory policies have identifiable winners and losers Gorges, 1999)_ So M ,~o ne appears to not be able to give a compelling reason why policies which are redistributive should b e isolated from democratic contestation so he can not diminish the demands of the democratic deficit thesis for more responsive and accountable EU officials.
The next two m ajor points of contention are raised by Moravcsik (2006) . The first point of contention is detailed by Follesdal and Hix when they claim the "match between preferen ces and policies should no t only occur as a matter of fact, but there should be mechanisms that reliably ensure that this power will indeed be so used (2006, 545)". Moravcsik uses empirical evidence to respond to the 'drift' and 'accountability' argument to show that present policy outcomes created by EU institutions are acce ptable to citizens. Based on tllls empirical evidence we can grant Moravcsik success in defeating the 'drift' argument that policy outcomes drift away from the preferences of the majority of voters in the EU. However, defense of institutions as democrati cally accountable must also show, according to Hix and Follesdal , that the institutions "can reliably be expected to secure more acceptable outcomes in the future than the alternatives considered" (2006, 545) . For example, the institutions must be sufficiently responsive to the best interests of the voters. Moravcsik with his empirical evidence focusing on the acceptability of policy outcomes does not offer a response to the argument that the poli cy making process is unaccountable
The Democratic Deficit and the European Union's Constitutional Settlement to voters preferences, and therefore, cannot defeat the 'accountability' argument. However, Moravcsik can still argue that procedural constraints like oversized majorities and indirect control of EU officials by national parliaments may make it more likely that policy outcomes acceptable to the majority of citizens will still be reached. Essentially, this second point of contention shows that it is still highly contested whether or not the 'accountability' argument can be dismissed with only empirical evidence of outcome acceptability without showing that the policy creation m echanism will tend to secure the most acceptable outcomes to a majority of voters .
The final remaining major point of contention centers on how voter preferences are determined. Follesdal and Hix argue that the key difference between democratic and nondemocratic institutions "is that citizens form their views about which policy option they prefer through a process of deliberation and party contestation that are essential elements of all democracies (2006, 545)". So if we follow Moravcsik's and Majone's concept of isolating certain arenas of policy making from public participation or deliberation we don't allow preferences to properly form among voters. This may explain why EU citizens see issues that the EU addresses as possessing low salience. The 'distance' and 'accountability' arguments prevent EU citizens from deliberating and participating in the policy making process so their preferences come out unformed or malformed. Basically, there is a serious disagreement in the democratic deficit debate about whether preferences and the salience of policy issues are formed endogenously to the policy making process or are fixed exogenously. This leads to a contentious disagreement between the two sides of the debate over whether the 'distance' and 'accountability' arguments are actually problematic for the EO. Given the three major poin~s of contention outlined above, the democratic deficit debate essentially appears to distill down to the democratic deficit thesis proponents arguing for a change in the EU to bring about a constrained form of democratic rule with more popular participation and deliberation. In contrast their opponents, like Majone and Moravcsik, support some weak form of technocratic rule with far less participation needed from the public.
PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Out of this rich debate on the democratic deficit thesis many proposals for constitutional reform to fix aspects of the EU that appear democratically illegitimate have been suggested. This final section presents four sets of proposals although dozens more have arisen from the democratic deficit debate.
First, there has arisen out of the democratic deficit debate a group of proposals to address the 'accountability' and 'distance' arguments of the democratic deficit thesis. This group of proposals attempts to provide the EU with issues to tackle which are more salient with voters. For example, Phillippe Schmitter advocates making the EU more redistributive by giving it more power in pensions and social security, giving it the power to be more supportive of immigrants and aliens, and allowing it to rebalance national welfare systems away from the elderly (2000) . Citizens would then be forced to reorient their attention in the direction of the EU agenda because the policy outcomes of the EU would be making them winners or losers. This would lead citizens to demand more elections of EU officials and actually nuke such elections about the direction of EU policy instead of second order national contests. According to Schmitter, expanding the powers of EU would in effect increase deliberation, improve preference formation, and increase participation by voters in the EU since the EU would be dealing with high salience issues (2000).
Moravcsik believes that following Schmitter's suggestion of making the EU more redistributive, and therefore, more sali ent in an attempt to increase deliberation, participation, and preference formation is a terrible idea (Moravcsik, 2004 , 26) . Moravcsik believes Schmitter presents a coherent scheme of reform directed at those that are most dissatisfied with the EU, namely the poor, less well educated, female, and public sector employees (2004, 26) . However, su ch a program of reform would not work because it would result in "a higher level of political conflict, domestic and interstate, than Europe has seen in several generations and perhaps the collapse of the organization" as the losers end their willingness to participate in the process of European integration as a result of the reform.s (2004, 26) .
However, fixing the 'accountability' and 'distance' arguments by increasing participation brought on by increasing the number of high salience issues the EU addresses is not a program of reform without merit. For example, during German y's EU presidency Chancellor Merkel has shown a willingness to mobilize public concern over climate change to try and re-launch the draft constitutional treaty (Williamson & Parker, 2007) . Germany decided not to cut down the treaty but improve it. The topic of climate protection has been chosen as an obvious candidate for addition to the treaty because it is an issue of high voter salience (Williamson & Parker, 2007) . These actions by Germany can b e seen as an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the European Union's policy making to the voters in hopes that they will participate in passing a revised draft constitutional treaty. So taking certain issues of high salience with voters and giving the EU the power to legislate on them may actually increase political participation by voters and partially fix the 'accountability' and 'distance' arguments.
The second group of proposals for constitutional reform is found in the draft copstitution. As stated earlier, the European constitutional project was in part undertaken as a way to respond.to the arguments made against the legitimacy of the EU in the democratic deficit thesis. There are a number of items contained in the draft constitution that attempt to address the democratic deficit thesis. For exam.ple, it extends the power of co-decision to almost all policy areas. This addresses the 'strong national executives' and 'weak European Parliament' arguments since the powers of the European Parliament dramatically improves as it becomes a truly equal partner in legislation with the Council during all policy making at the EU level. The draft treaty also requires the Council to meet in public when legislating, and therefore, addresses the 'distance argument' by nuking policy making less opaque and foreign to citizens. The draft treaty further address the 'weak European Parliament' argument by mandating that national parliaments receive info about new EU policy proposals with enough time to mandate ministers on how to vote in the Council. Perhaps, the most groundbreaking clause of the draft treaty is it gives national parliaments the ability to send back legislation to the Conmussion which the national parliaments believe is outside the scope of the European Union's policy portfolio as defined by previous treaties. This goes a long way towards remedying the 'strong national executives ' and 'weak European Parliament' arguments. Finally, the draft contains a clause which requires the Conmlission to consider any proposal for legislation which has the support of 1 nullion EU citizens. This reform starts to dispatch the 'drift' and 'distance' arguments. However, with the Dutch and French 'no ' votes to the draft constitution there has been a debate about whether the constitutional draft was too bold in its reforms or not revolutio nary enough. The German govermnent, the current h olders of the EU presiden cy in the Council, has made it known that it will not remove clauses from the draft constitution but attempt to add bolder reforms as it attempts to re-Iaunch the draft constitution (Williamson & Parker, 2007) .
The final two sets of proposals for constitutio nal reform are diametrically opposed when it comes to the future direction of reform to the EU. The third set of proposals sees the failure of the draft constitution as a sign that the current constitutional arrangem ents are sufficient and the EU is for the m ost part already democrati call y legitimate. The fourth set of proposals supports the current EU presidency's positio n by arguing that bolder reforrns are needed for the constitutio n b eyond those contained in the draft constitution if the dem ocratic deficit is going to be remedied.
The third set of proposals favo r drastically cutting down the dratt constitution if it is going to be relaunch ed or allowing the draft to die. M oravcsik has been a strong advocate of maintaining the current constitutional status guo (2006, 238) . Keep in nl.ind that he argues that even if elem ents of the democratic deficit exist they are not problematic. He argues that holding the EU up to a standard of direct majoritarian democra cy is counterproductive and im practi cal (2006, 238) . This is the case because no m odern democracy meets this standard and no modern democracy aspires to do so. According to this viewpoint, m any elements of the EU that are attacked in the democratic deficit thesis are ac tuall y assets to the E U give n the low salience of the issues the EU legislates on and the intentio nal isolation of certain portfolios in the EU from politicization. According to M oravcsik, those supporting a final constitutional settlem ent for Europe or the draft constitution, erroneously believe that public participati on and deliberation are ends in themselves and are the sole source' ofl egitim3cy (2006, 238) . H e argues that the view that the E U suffers from a democratic deficit compared to its member states comes from the fact that the EU deals with iss ues that are also commonly delegated and insulated in the member states' dom~stic political scenes (2006, 239) . Those advocating the third set of proposals for constitutional reform essentially defend the status guo. T hey see the failure of the draft constitution as a demonstratio n of Europe's success and stability. To sununarize, according to M oravcsik, they see in the failure of draft constitution " the stability of both the substantive and institutional dimensions of the current constitutional settlement" (2006, 236) .
The fourth and final set of proposals attempt more drama tic reform of the constitution in an effort to increase political contestation in all the institutions of the EU. For example, proponents of this path, like Follesdal and Hix, advocate more political contestation as essential for preference formation among voters and for the exercise of accountability over officials at the EU level by voters in the EU (2006, . To bring abo ut an increase in political contestation they propose increasing the power of the Europea n Parliament to allow the political parties that are fo rming in the Parliament to politicize the policy making process further. They also propose more transparency in the Council in the fo rm of allowing the m edia to report who proposed which policies, who proposed amendments, and w ho was on each side when the final vote was taken . This increased transparency would allow the public to hold governments responsible fo r their vo tes in the Council.
Advocates of the fourth set of proposals, like Hix and Follesdal, argue that the Conmu ssion's role in setting the policy agenda needs to be open to contestatio n and criticism (2006, 554) . Furthermore, this viewpoint advances that an institutional mechanism http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/13 needs to be found fo r generating m o re debate and contestation about politics in the EU, not just debate abo ut the EU as an institution. Hix and Follesdal propose opening up the presidency of the conUllissio n to political contestatio n as the simplest m ethod of achieving tlus desired institutio nal mechanism . Hix proposes a direct electio n of the C ommission preside nt by the citizens o r the national parliaments (2002) . A less ambitio us route would be to m ake the natio nal executives in the Council all ow a more open battle for president of the conunission with o ut further constitutional refo rm . It is thou ght by proponents of the fourth set of proposals that increased political contestation fo r the President of the ConU11issio n would create m ore debate abo ut the best policy agenda to r the EU am o ng the citizens and offi cials in the EO. This refo rm, according to advocates of m o re radi cJI refo rms than those proposed in the drJft constitution, wo uld take an enorm ous step towa rds destroying the dem ocratic deficit in the EO. H owever, bolder refo rm of the E uropean Unio n 's constitutio n m akes sense if and o nl y if we reall y believe that the elem ents of the E U w hich are described as undem ocratic are actually problematic.
CONCLUSION
I am most persuaded by the set o f proposals whi ch attempt m ore dramatic reform of the constitution in an effo rt to increase political contestati on. Wlule I think there are stro ng countera rguments against the ' weak E uropean Parliament Argument' and the 'strong n atio nal executive ' elem ents of the dem ocratic deficit, the 'distance ' and 'accountability' arguments have, in m y opiluon, no t been adequately countered . For this reason I tend to favo r the proposals fo r constitutional reforms that present m echanism s for increasing political contestatio n. I think only lllo re contestatio n in the European Union 's policy niaking and leadership contests will m ake the public truly begin to deliberate, participate, and h old EU policy makers accountable. I don 't agree with MorJvcsik when he claims that preferen ces can be fo rmed exogeno us to the policy m aking process. In my mind issues w ill only becom e more salient to vo ters if they form preferences on the issues and preferences can o nly be formed thro ugh participati o n . There are m echanisms which will encourage the formatio n of preference and make E U policy portfolios more salient. T hese m echalusms should be implem ented . It is my o piluo n that witho ut the benefits wluch flow from further political contestatio n the E U will m aintain the status quo of technocratic rule and continue to have a severe dem ocratic deficit .
The contribu tio ns of the scholars discussed in this paper to form alizing and enriching the debate about the dem ocratic defi cit thesis have certainly led to m any new proposals fo r refo rnung the constitutio n of the E uropean Unio n . We started by defining the dem ocratic defi cit thesis and then exanuned som e respo nses to the thesis. N ext, we tried to fl esh o ut the m aj o r remailung points of contentio n that exist in the democratic defi cit debate: Finally, we exanuned four sets of proposals fo r further co nstitutio nal reform that have com e out of the dem ocratic deficit debate. A consensus on the future of constitutional reform in the E U or the existence of the democratic defi cit has not been reached and probably will n ever be achieved. However, it is clear that the direction of future constitutional reforms in the EU will b e heavily influe nced by develo pments in the debate surrounding the existence of a dem ocratic deficit in the E O.
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